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PHILOSOPHY UNBOUND: THE IDEA OF GLOBAL PHILOSOPHY 
Thom Brooks 
Abstract 
The future of philosophy is moving towards ‘global philosophy’. The idea of global 
philosophy is the view that different philosophical approaches may engage more substantially 
with each other to solve philosophical problems. Most solutions attempt to use only those 
available resources located within one philosophical tradition. A more promising approach 
might be to expand the range of available resources to better assist our ability to offer more 
compelling solutions. This search for new horizons in order to improve our clarity about 
philosophical issues is at the heart of global philosophy. The idea of global philosophy 
encourages us to look beyond our traditions to improve our philosophical problem-solving by 
our own lights. Global philosophy is a new approach whose time is coming. This article 
offers the first account of this approach and assessment of its future promise. 
 
Introduction 
The future of philosophy is moving towards ‘global philosophy’. The idea of global 
philosophy is the view that different philosophical approaches may engage more substantially 
with each other to solve philosophical problems. Most solutions attempt to use only those 
available resources located within one philosophical tradition. A more promising approach 
might be to expand the range of available resources to better assist our ability to offer more 
compelling solutions. This search for new horizons in order to improve our clarity about 
philosophical issues is at the heart of global philosophy. The idea of global philosophy 
encourages us to look beyond our traditions to improve our philosophical problem-solving by 
our own lights. Global philosophy is a new approach whose time is coming. This article 
offers the first account of this approach and assessment of its future promise. 
 The idea that philosophers should engage more substantively with different traditions 
is often met with scepticism. There are several reasons for this, but perhaps the primary 
reason is the lack of clear pay-offs. Deeper engagement with unfamiliar philosophical 
traditions may involve significant transactions costs, such as the time required to build an 
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understanding of another tradition sufficiently robust to mine it for new ideas. These costs 
will not be considered worthwhile where the benefits are unsubstantial. Therefore, a major 
barrier to the pursuit of global philosophy is this concern that the potential benefits are 
outweighed by the likely costs. The idea of global philosophy might only succeed where clear 
benefits become more certain. 
 I believe that there are clear benefits and greater engagement between traditions will 
become more likely in future. Our world is shrinking: greater globalization has brought with 
it greater diversity in our social and political communities, as well as the academic 
community. Academic philosophy must rise to the new challenges arising from this 
multicultural diversity. For example, if philosophers lack a minimal understanding about non-
Western thought, then this is increasingly less true of our students. Closer engagement 
between traditions may reap pedagogical benefits in better educating an increasingly diverse 
student body about philosophy. This engagement may yield a further benefit not merely in 
how different traditions might relate, but, more importantly, how one might learn from the 
other. The future engagement between traditions is more likely to occur and this is a welcome 
development for the further development of philosophy as a global approach.  
 This article offers the first account of global philosophy. I will begin by first 
addressing the idea of a philosophical tradition and how they have developed as relatively 
bounded traditions. This leads us to consider the possibility of global philosophy and this 
should be conceived. I will offer several illustrations that are meant to be indicative of the 
ways in which a more global approach to philosophy may be expected to produce useful 
philosophical benefits. The article concludes with a consideration of possible objections and 
why global philosophy offers much future promise. The conclusion is that global philosophy 
is an idea whose time is coming.  
3 
 
 
Traditions as Bounded 
Global philosophy attempts to overcome the limitations found in more bounded philosophical 
traditions. It is important to become clear of these limitations before turning to how they may 
be overcome. This section will clarify what is meant by the idea of philosophy as bounded 
and how this may limit attempts to address philosophical problems. 
 The idea of a philosophical tradition is rich and complex. Traditions are often sites of 
great diversity. Consider the liberal tradition. This tradition includes a wide range of 
canonical figures from Thomas Hobbes and John Locke through T. H. Green and John Stuart 
Mill to Brian Barry and John Rawls (see Barry 2001; Hobbes 1996; Locke 1988; Mill 1989; 
Rawls 1971; Rawls 1996). Liberals include advocates and opponents of popular democracy, 
as well as contractarians, Hegelians, utilitarians, and much more. At its heart, inclusion in a 
tradition often involves some acknowledgement of a shared identity. While they may be 
many significant differences over several issues, one important factor in understanding 
Hobbes and Rawls as co-members of a shared tradition relates to a shared sense of identity 
and philosophical belonging. For example, Rawls says that Hobbes’s Leviathan is ‘surely the 
greatest work of political philosophy in English’ and that Rawls understands his project to be 
a further development of problems that Hobbes raised previously (2001, 1). So one common 
thread linking Hobbes with Rawls is the centrality of consent and the acceptance of a 
contractarian view about justice. But another important connection is the commitment to a 
shared philosophical venture. The idea of a philosophical tradition is linked with the sense of 
shared belonging and identity whatever else it may be.
1
 
                                                 
1
 My discussion brackets many related important questions about the form and content of a philosophical 
tradition as a tradition. I accept that there is more to any tradition than a set of family resemblances. But I also 
accept that a tradition is also related to the recognition of a shared belonging whatever else a tradition may be. 
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 Most philosophical traditions operate in a relatively bounded way. For example, each 
seeks to address problems from their own set of resources without substantive engagement 
with multiple traditions. One illustration is the liberal tradition and its attempts to address the 
problem of political stability over time (see Hobbes 1996; Rawls 1996). While these attempts 
engage with non-liberal traditions, those engaged with share important spheres of established 
contact that breed greater familiarity. While Hegel’s philosophy offers an alternative to 
liberalism, it engages with canonical liberal philosophers and ideas (see Brooks 2007; Hegel 
1990). This engagement across traditions has led to later engagement in future (see Rawls 
1996, 285-88; Rawls 2000, 329-71).  
These examples are meant to be indicative of the view that traditions have great 
diversity and most traditions are bounded rather than closed. A closed tradition would be a 
tradition that denies all engagement with other traditions. While many debates may be 
conducted among members of a shared tradition, most debates make some attempt to engage 
with alternative traditions. So our situation is not about whether our tradition is open or 
closed to wider engagement. It is rather whether our tradition might benefit from becoming 
unbound and engaging more substantively with traditions where their relations may be less 
established.  
Philosophical traditions are open to engagement, but they remain bounded. The idea 
of a bounded tradition comes in degrees. Wider engagement across traditions may be more or 
less bounded. Too often it is relatively bounded. This is where engagement occurs between 
different, but familiar and established alternatives. One example already noted might be the 
relation between liberalism and Hegelian philosophy. Each is distinct from the other although 
there is an established history of mutual engagement. This has led to important innovations in 
                                                                                                                                                        
There is more to be said about the role of intended meanings and their reception by audiences over time that I 
bracket here although I am aware of these and other important issues that may bear on this analysis (see Bevir 
2002; Brooks 2006). 
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the development of each tradition (see Bosanquet 1923; Brooks 2012; Brudner 2009; Green 
1986).  
There is then much potential promise for future benefits from wider engagement with 
new and less familiar traditions as these examples indicate. The problem is that there has 
been relatively little work satisfactorily making this case thus far. This is not to say that there 
have been no attempts already at bridging Western and non-Western philosophical ideas (see 
Barnhart 2012; Carpenter and Ganeri 2010; Hutton 2006; Hutton 2008; Parekh 2006). It is to 
say that such attempts have been too rare.  
Most work exploring the bridges between Western and non-Western ideas has been in 
the area of comparative philosophy (see Scharfstein 1998). This work has produced important 
advances in our understanding about our traditions and alternatives in addition to highlighting 
illuminating points of relation.
2
 Nonetheless, comparative philosophy as a disciplinary project 
has been unsuccessful at demonstrating to most philosophers the need for wider engagement 
with new traditions. Perhaps one reason for this lack of success is because comparative 
philosophy has been an enterprise primarily focussed on the history of philosophy. While 
comparative philosophy has demonstrated that diverse traditions may possess important 
points of comparison and similarity, it has unsuccessfully motivated further study by leading 
figures. The case not yet made is the philosophical importance of bringing traditions into 
relationship.  
 This is a case that should be made. Consider the issue of global justice. Most leading 
work in this area is found within a relatively narrow set of traditions generally exclusive of 
non-Western thought thus far (see Brooks 2008a). This narrow set of traditions offer 
solutions to global problems, such as the problem of severe poverty. Global problems like 
                                                 
2
 One example that is often highlighted concerns the similarities between Niccolo Machiavelli’s The Prince and 
Kautilya’s Arthasastra (see Brown 1953, 49-52). 
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severe poverty are neither exclusively Western nor non-Western. Yet, the philosophical 
traditions that attempt solutions to problems that may concern everyone are too often 
formulated without some substantive engagement with traditions that relate to global 
diversity. Global problems are ‘global’ in at least two ways. First, they are geographically 
global in that they are found in places across continents. Secondly, global problems are 
‘global’ philosophically: such problems are not the exclusive subject-matter for any one 
tradition. At issue is the fact that much of the leading work on global justice operates almost 
entirely within a relatively bounded approach. Global justice is about global problems, but its 
formulation is largely independent of global thought.  
My argument is not that such approaches should be jettisoned because of this 
shortcoming, but rather that this work might be improved through greater philosophical 
engagement. Global justice may address global issues, but it has not established its status as 
‘global’ philosophically. We have seen that traditions meaningfully engage with each other to 
improve philosophical problem-solving. The problem is that traditions have tended to engage 
only with those alternatives where there is established engagement already. The obstacle now 
is to make the case for why new horizons are worth seeking for philosophical benefit.  
 
Towards a Global Philosophy 
Global philosophy is any unbounded approach to philosophy. We participate in global 
philosophy whenever we engage beyond traditional boundaries in pursuit of philosophical 
benefits. The difference between global philosophy and alternative approaches is that it is 
unbounded: global philosophy is unfettered by self-limitation to engagement with what is 
established and familiar, but open to what is new. Global philosophy is an approach to 
philosophy that may be pursued by liberals, Hegelians, and much more. Thus, a liberal 
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committed to global philosophy is open to exploring a wider range of traditions for new ideas. 
The motivation involved is the improved ability to address philosophical problem-solving. So 
a liberal global philosophy may seek to engage with traditions of both East and West to 
discover new ideas that might become redeployed within liberalism that might improve its 
success at offering compelling arguments. 
 It should be noted that often the lack of serious engagement confronts philosophers 
working from within Western traditions. There is a large body of impressive work that 
seriously engages with Western traditions from alternatives, such as Indian philosophical 
traditions (see Ganeri 2011; Parekh 2006; Raghuramaraju 2011; Sivaraksa 1992). There is 
also an increasing amount of work available that renders Indian philosophical traditions more 
accessible for Western audiences (see Bushan and Garfield 2011).
3
 Moreover, there is much 
outstanding philosophical work being undertaken within the Indian philosophical tradition 
that has developed with an awareness of developments in Western philosophical traditions 
(see Radhakrishnan and Moore 1957, 575-637; Raghuramaraju 2006; Raghuramaraju 2009). 
So the issue is not a lack of high philosophical engagement by non-Western traditions. Nor is 
the issue the availability of such work. While many Indian philosophers have meaningfully 
engaged with Western traditions, this has not yet been reciprocated in large measure.
4
 
 There are several ways in which our taking more seriously an engagement with less 
familiar philosophical traditions may lead to illuminating avenues for future work. I will 
confine illustrations to how Western traditions might engage further with Indian 
philosophical traditions in the areas of ethics and political philosophy. These examples are 
meant to be indicative only of the likely future benefits for Western traditions: an exhaustive 
examination would require far more space than permitted here. I will now turn to three 
                                                 
3
 There are also related developments in Buddhist philosophy (see Hanh 2008; Kongtrul 1987).  
4
 My interests in Indian philosophy are longstanding and my original interest in philosophy more generally (see 
Brooks 2002; Brooks 2008b). 
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different issues where the Indian philosophical literature that may contribute to new 
developments for liberalism. 
 One issue concerns our diverse identities. Societies are social spaces filled with 
diversity. The challenge is how best to respond to the diverse identities that individuals claim 
for themselves while best guaranteeing political stability over time. This is understood as the 
problem of political stability (see Rawls 1996, 3-4). One solution is the creation of an 
overlapping consensus through the use of public reasons (see Rawls 1996,131-72). The idea 
is that reasons acceptable to all provide satisfactory public support for policies that respect 
the reasonable diversity characterizing political society.  
There have been several important objections to this solution to the problem of 
political stability. One objection is that any overlapping consensus we might construct will be 
too fragile to guarantee future political stability in light of the deep differences that remain 
(see Wenar 1995). A second objection is that an overlapping consensus should be rejected to 
the extent it is contractarian (see Nussbaum 2006). 
 The Indian philosophical tradition offers some possible insights into how this problem 
might be better addressed. The first insight is to challenge the model of ‘moral monism’ and 
resistance to cultural pluralism that may be found at the core of much contemporary liberal 
thought developed from a greater understanding of an ‘intercultural’ view of equality and 
fairness indebted to Indian philosophical ideas (see Parekh 2006). A further insight might be 
to claim that political stability might best be secured through a guarantee of a threshold in 
human capabilities (see Nussbaum 2000). The capabilities approach is to some degree a 
major achievement of a global philosophy approach with deep roots in multiple traditions, 
including Aristotelianism and classical Indian philosophy (see Sen 2009). This approach 
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claims that all persons should be guaranteed well-being in terms of the capability to do or be. 
Political stability might be best secured through the protection of human capabilities.  
 A second issue is the relationship between our moral duties. The problem arises where 
there may be possible conflicts between duties. For example, Immanuel Kant argues that our 
moral duties do not conflict as part of a universal moral law (see Kant 2011). Hegel famously 
rejects this position as ‘an empty formalism’ lacking content (see 1990, 161-63). Nonetheless, 
the idea that our duties should not come into conflict has continued popularity. One concern 
is that if our duties did conflict we might lack some means to decide between them. 
 The Indian philosophical tradition has relevance here. The Bhagavad Gita is perhaps 
one of the most famous Indian texts and its most often discussed section relates to a specific 
dialogue between the divine Krishna and the human warrior Arjuna (see Radhakrishnan 
1948). It is the eve of a battle between Arjuna and his army against their cousins. While he is 
certain his cause is just and he will be victorious, these results will only become achieved 
through much bloodshed and suffering including the deaths of many including his own 
relatives. Arjuna becomes resigned to the view that perhaps it would be better to permit his 
unjust cousins to govern in order to avoid these tragedies. Krishna advises Arjuna that he 
must engage in battle using, in Sen’s words, ‘duty-centred and consequence-independent 
reasoning’ (Sen 2009: 209).  
There are several suggestive lessons that arise from this account. The first is that our 
duty to justice trumps other duties that may potentially conflict. Arjuna may have duties to 
fight his just cause and duties against causing harm to his relatives, but where such a choice 
must be made it should be on the side of the just cause. The second suggestive lesson is that 
our duties require commitments. The decision to perform our duties may be consequence-
independent, but the resolve to complete our duties must account for our personal 
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responsibilities (see Sen 2009, 213-14). Some decisions are easier said than done 
independently from questions about whether we suffer from weakness of will. These 
positions about weighing up our different prospective duties in light of our other 
commitments inform leading work in the Western philosophical tradition as well and not 
least Hegel’s Philosophy of Right. So the argument is not that Western traditions lack a 
similar perspective, but rather that they might benefit from a closer engagement with these 
related ideas found in less familiar traditions. 
 A third issue for many philosophical traditions more generally relates to the goal of 
philosophical disputes. What is this goal? For some in the Western tradition this goal may be 
nothing more than the desire for greater clarity into some important philosophical issue. Or 
perhaps for others the goal is not merely to provide improved illumination of key issues, but 
to convince others to join in agreement.  
 The Indian philosophical tradition has a fairly clear position on this issue: our goal is 
to seek liberation (see Radhakrishnan and Moore 1957, 46-47, 95-96; Swami 1935). Literally 
speaking, the truth will set you free (see Rinpoche 1991). The idea of liberation through the 
pursuit of improved knowledge has several connotations and some are religious. Nevertheless, 
there is something liberating in the satisfaction that comes each time we improve our 
understanding about important philosophical issues. Perhaps we pursue philosophical 
arguments not merely for its own sake, but in order to learn something about ourselves as 
well. Maybe even to enjoy a sense of satisfaction that may arrive with each forward step 
towards our philosophical goals. In these ways, this tradition may help inform why we 
engage in philosophical disputes. 
 This discussion is intentionally suggestive and indicative of where future benefits may 
be mined from the Indian philosophical tradition broadly conceived. The ambition is to 
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demonstrate that our issues are not exclusive to our traditions and that alternative traditions 
may have resources we might employ in our own way to better address issues we are engaged 
with. Alternative perspectives may encourage us to look more closely at our debates in a new 
way. 
 
Critical Appraisal 
We have been able to identify global philosophy as a distinctive approach and considered 
three arguments indicative of how a global philosophy might be pursued for philosophical 
benefits.  I now turn to several potential criticisms concerning its future promise and popular 
appeal. 
 A first possible criticism is that global philosophy may breed redundancy. The worry 
is that less familiar traditions may be too alien for meaningful engagement. Instead, we must 
cash out these less familiar traditions in ways that are more recognizable to make progress 
with their ideas. The problem is that this may render less familiar traditions redundant. For 
example, suppose we understood an unfamiliar philosophical tradition in light of its close 
relation to something more familiar. Thus, we grasp a philosopher, such as Shankara, in terms 
of Hegelian philosophy. This may help render Shankara’s philosophy as more intelligible in 
some sense, but the problem is that we might be better off examining Hegelian philosophy 
more closely instead. To grasp Shankara in this way is to reinvent the philosophical wheel. 
 This criticism mistakes the goal of global philosophy. Our goal is not to compare and 
contrast per se, but to uncover new philosophical insights in order to further develop our own 
traditions. While a deeper engagement with Shankara’s work is surely rewarding, it is also 
highly time intensive. The goal of an approach rooted in global philosophy is not necessarily 
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to comprehend every possible school of thought. Instead, the goal is to further develop our 
own tradition through engagement with other traditions. We need not come to any definitive 
views about alternative traditions: what matters is how their ideas might be put to good 
philosophical use in our own tradition. So global philosophy may overcome this potential 
problem.   
 A second possible criticism is that global philosophy may breed incoherence. The 
problem is that our traditions possess some identifiable coherence that makes possible their 
recognition as a particular tradition. The problem is that a closer engagement with other 
traditions might undermine the coherence of our own positions. Rather than engage more 
closely, we should instead maintain the distinctiveness of our philosophical positions. 
 This criticism rests on a mistaken view about the nature of philosophical traditions. 
Traditions are never static, but constantly evolving to respond to the changing issues that 
confront traditions over time. A good example is the development of liberalism from Hobbes 
through Mill to Rawls. Our traditions change. So the problem is not that we might revise our 
arguments in light of close engagement with alternative traditions. Our goal should be on 
improving the ability of our tradition to address philosophical issues. We should actively seek 
resources that best facilitate this goal. One potentially promising approach is the idea of 
philosophy as unbound and engaged with diverse traditions. Global philosophy need not 
render our traditions incoherent, but it might improve our ability to address philosophical 
issues.  
 A third possible criticism is that global philosophy may be insufficiently ‘global’. 
What is global about global philosophy? Global philosophy is an unbounded approach to how 
we might improve our existing traditions. It is not a claim to their being one true philosophy 
that best combines all others. Nor is it about bringing together as many traditions together as 
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possible for its own sake. Instead, global philosophy is about our having an openness for the 
need to pursue wider engagement in order to improve potential argumentative power. Global 
philosophy is global in light of its global pursuit for philosophical resources only. Of course, 
many philosophers, including Hegel, have offered us world historical accounts of 
philosophies that attempt to speak to all traditions. However, the difference is that global 
philosophy as understood by me is not about speaking to all traditions, but rather speaking 
with diverse traditions. This is not pursued for its own sake. Instead, our goal is philosophical 
improvement through unbounded openness to new horizons. 
 The three possible criticisms of global philosophy are not exhaustive. Nonetheless, 
they present serious obstacles that global philosophy must overcome. This discussion has 
concluded that global philosophy is able to address these challenges. We must keep in mind 
that the idea of global philosophy exists only in its infancy: I am addressing a philosophical 
field that I believe will rise to some future prominence in academic circles rather than 
identifying an established disciplinary field.  
 
Conclusion 
Global philosophy is an approach to philosophical problem-solving that is likely to become 
more commonplace as our societies and universities further diversify. While philosophers 
may already engage meaningfully across traditions, this engagement is often confined to what 
is established and familiar. More importantly, this work often excludes meaningful 
engagement more widely with less familiar traditions, including Indian philosophy. There has 
already been any number of substantial contributions arising from deep engagement between 
traditions familiar with each other. Similarly, there may be the likelihood of further 
substantial contributions arising from engagement with less familiar traditions. A major 
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obstacle has been that comparative philosophy has been largely confined to historical 
comparisons without highlighting sufficiently clearly how contemporary Western philosophy 
might improve their ability to address problems through engagement with non-Western 
philosophical traditions.  
 Global philosophy accepts this challenge. It calls on each of us to unbound our 
philosophical traditions. The goal is not to develop one single view of philosophy for all, but 
to improve the philosophical views we have already. I have indicated briefly three potential 
areas for how such engagement might be established. While the illustrations used have 
related to my interests in ethics and political philosophy as well as their development in 
Indian philosophical traditions, the wider possibilities of global philosophy extend far beyond 
these fields and traditions.  
If I had to predict the future of philosophy, then I am willing to bet that its future will 
find greater engagement between less familiar philosophical traditions including Western and 
non-Western traditions. This is a future well worth welcoming with open arms. We have 
much to learn from each other about how we might improve our understanding of 
philosophical issues. As the world grows ever smaller, so our philosophical engagement will 
develop more widely. Philosophy will become unbound, more engaged, and better situated to 
address pressing future problems as a result. The future, in short, is global philosophy.
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